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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
In the Matter of the Estate ] 
of Katherine Wentland Gorrell, ] 
Deceased, ] 
v. ] 
Robert E. Gorrell, ] 
Appellant. ] 
> Case No. 860113-CA 
PETITION FOR REHEARING 
Pursuant to the terms of Rule 35, of the Rules of the 
Utah Court of Appeals, respondent, First Security Bank of Utah, 
N. A., hereinafter ("First Security11) petitions the Court for a 
rehearing of the decision entered on July 27, 1987. In support 
of this petition, First Security respectfully submits that the 
Court's July 27th decision, namely, to award appellant all of 
the $43,700.00, is not supported by the facts in evidence, is 
contrary to the findings of the trial court, and in effect 
improperly finds the $43,700.00 to be joint tenancy property. 
ARGUMENT 
This Court in reversing the lower court's decision has 
not only ruled that the $43,700.00 was not the sole property of 
the estate of Katherine Gorrell, but has apparently ruled that 
the $43,700.00 is the sole property of the appellant. 
The facts of this case do not support such a result. 
The parties stipulated at the commencement of the 
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hearing and appellant testified that prior to finding the 
$43,700.00, appellant had no knowledge of the money's existence. 
Appellant testified that on the same day that decedent 
died, he went in to rearrange the cupboards in the kitchen and 
found approximately $43,700.00 in a heart shaped beauty box in 
a blue agate roasting pan (Tr - 35 and 46). Appellant also 
testified that he had never done any cooking as long as he was 
married to Katherine Gorrell (Tr - 35). 
During the trial, appellant testified that Katherine 
Gorrell was the only one that knew where the money came from 
(Tr - 36). Appellant, respondent and the trial court all 
agreed that the $43,700.00 found in Mrs. Gorrell's home had 
been in her sole possession and control at the time of her 
death. 
Respondent acknowledges that a finding that the money 
was in Mrs. Gorrellfs exclusive possession does not establish 
where the money came from. On the issue of where the money 
came from, the trial judge found three equally plausible 
alternatives: 
1. Mrs. Gorrell saved the money from Mr. Gorrell's 
earnings. 
2. Mrs. Gorrell saved the money prior to the marriage. 
3. The savings consisted of moneys from both Mr. and 
Mrs. Gorrell (Tr - 111). 
No matter which scenario this Court or any court 
accepts, it is important to note that Mrs. Gorrell did the 
saving and that Mrs. Gorrell had an interest in the money saved. 
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During the Gorrellfs marriage, Mrs. Gorrell was the 
business manager and handled all of the money (Tr -37-40). She 
did the cooking and she took care of Mr. Gorrell through all of 
his medical problems which, as Mr. Gorrell testified, was no 
easy job for a woman her age (Tr -27). 
Respondent was at an enormous disadvantage during the 
trial of this case in that respondent's key witness, the 
witness that knew the source of the $43,700.00, was dead and 
unable to testify. The trial court heard the full side of Mr. 
Gorrellfs story and only fragments of Mrs. Gorrellfs story. In 
spite of that fact, the trial judge found from the evidence 
that he did not know the source of the money. By reversing the 
trial court, respondent contends that this Court has made a 
factual finding that the money belonged to appellant. 
POINT I. THE FINDINGS OF FACT OF THE LOWER COURT 
SHOULD NOT BE SET ASIDE BY THIS APPELLATE COURT. 
In the case of Garcia v. Schwendiman, 645 P.2d 651 
(Utah 1982) , the Utah Supreme Court: 
The standard for appellate review of factual 
findings affords great difference to the trial 
court's view of the evidence unless the trial 
court has misapplied the law or its findings are 
clearly against the weight of the evidence. 
And in First Security Bank of Utah, N. A., vs. Hall, 
supra, that court stated: 
As this court has stated in numerous prior 
decisions, we will not disturb the findings of 
the trial court unless the court has misapplied 
proven facts or made findings clearly against the 
weight of evidence. 
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The trial court did not make a finding in this case 
that the $43,700.00 belonged to Mr. Gorrell. This Court has 
ruled that the lower court improperly placed the burden of 
proof in this case on Mr. Gorrell. Respondent contends that 
once the court has made that finding the case should either be 
remanded for further findings by the lower court or the Appeals 
Court should apply the law within the factual finding already 
made by the trial court. 
In the instant case, respondent fails to understand 
how appellant could be deemed to be the sole owner of the 
discovered money under the facts presented to the lower court. 
POINT II. NO JOINT TENANCY OWNERSHIP EXISTED IN THE 
$43,700.00 
The Utah Supreme Court in the case of Neill v. Royce, 
120 P2d 327 (1942) held that absent the designation of joint 
tenancy the law favored a finding of tenancy in common. The 
court stated: 
The historical background of a joint tenancy 
has an interesting and fluctuating record. In 
the early English common law the general rule was 
that in the absence of an express provision 
severing the interests, a transfer of estates was 
deemed by law a joint tenancy at this early time 
for the reason that a tenancy in common tended to 
split the feudal tenures, thus rendering it 
difficult to collect these feudal military 
services. . . . 
When the military tenures were abolished and 
converted into free and common socage by the 
statute 12 Chas. II, (1660) C. 24, Sec. 1, the 
reason for such presumption of joint tenancy 
ceased to exist. . . . Hence, in the absence of 
express words to the contrary, the presumption of 
the law reversed itself from presuming a joint 
tenancy to favoring and presuming a tenancy in 
common. 
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Utah Code Annotated 57-1-5 (1953 as amended) states: 
Every interest in real estate granted to two or 
more persons in their own right shall be a 
tenancy in common, unless expressly declared in 
the grant to be otherwise. Use of words lfjoint 
tenancy11 or "with rights of survivorship11 or "and 
to the survivor of them11 or words of similar 
import shall declare a joint tenancy. A sole 
owner of real property shall create a joint 
tenancy in himself and another or others by 
making a transfer to himself and such other or 
others as joint tenants by use of such words as 
herein provided or by conveying to another person 
or persons an interest in land in which an 
interest is retained by the grantor and by 
declaring the creation of a joint tenancy by use 
of such words as herein provided. In all cases 
the interest of joint tenants must be equal and 
undivided. 
Although this statute covers only real property, the 
legislature, consistent with Neill v. Royce, supra, has 
expressed a preference for tenancy in common, unless the owner-
ship is expressly declared to be otherwise. 
In order for a joint tenancy to exist, it has long 
been recognized that a unity of time, title, possession and 
interest must exist. 20 Am Jur 2d P. 96, Cotenancy and Joint 
Ownership §4 
In the case before this court, whether there was a 
unity of time is unknown because we do not know the source of 
the money. However, the unities of title, possession and 
interest do not exist where appellant does not know where the 
money came from (Tr - 35-36), and agrees that the decedent did 
know. Appellant could have no unity of title, possession or 
interest in property, the very existence of which he knew 
nothing about, where the decedent possessed and controlled the 
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money during her lifetime. 
A joint tenancy ownership of the $43,700.00 cannot be 
found in this case absent a written expression to that effect 
or facts sufficient to support a joint tenancy. If this court 
finds that a joint tenancy ownership of the $43,700.00 did not 
exist at the time of the decedent's death, then it seems only 
logical to respondent that the court would find that the money 
was owned by the Gorrells as tenants in common. If the money 
was owned by the Gorrells as tenants in common, then one-half 
of the money belonged to Mr. Gorrell and the other half 
belonged to the estate. 
CONCLUSION 
The First Security Bank, as personal representative of 
the Gorrell estate, had no choice in this case but to argue 
that the $43,700.00 should have been included in the decedent's 
estate. The decedent was survived by not only a husband but by 
three children of a prior marriage. Those three children 
together with First Security Bank believed earnestly that the 
$43,700.00 or some portion thereof should have been included in 
the estate because Mr. Gorrell had no knowledge of the 
existence of the money prior to Mrs. Gorrell's death. All 
parties to this action have respected Mr. Gorrellfs honesty in 
coming forward with the fact that he had discovered the money 
and knew nothing about its existence prior to that discovery. 
Absent such a declaration by Mr. Gorrell, this case would not 
be pending before this Court. 
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In this case, in order for this Court or the trial 
court to award all of the money to Mr. Gorrell, it must find 
that Mr. Gorrell owned the money at the time of Mrs. Gorrellfs 
death. 
Ownership of money could be established by 
possession. 54 Am Jur 2d 554, Money §6. If possession is the 
test of ownership in this case, the estate should prevail, 
where the lower court specifically found that Mrs. Gorrell was 
in control and possession of the money at the time of her death. 
If possession alone is insufficient to establish 
ownership, then respondent can only assume that this Court is 
attempting to determine ownership by looking to the source of 
the money. The trial court, after considering all of the 
evidence in the case and the demeanor of the witnesses, found 
that although several possibilities existed as to the source of 
the money, it was unable to determine the moneys source. 
Unless this Court first determines that the trial court 
misapplied proven facts or made findings clearly against the 
weight of evidence, then it must also so find. 
The money that was possessed and controlled by Mrs. 
Gorrell was not in joint tenancy. Respondent contends that if 
it was not joint tenancy property and was not proven to be Mr. 
Gorrellfs money, then it should not be awarded to him. 
Respondent contends further that the money should 
either be divided equally as cotenancy property or at the very 
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least this case should be remanded to the trial court for a 
further factual finding as to the ownership of the money. 
DATED this /^^Siay of August, 1987. 
VAN COTT, BAGLEY, CORNWALL & McCARTHY 
lichael J. Giasmann 
Attorneys 'for Respondent, First 
Security Bank of Utah, N. A. 
-8-
CERTIFICATE OF COUNSEL 
Pursuant to the terms of Rule 35 (a) of the Rules of 
the Utah Court of Appeals, Michael J. Glasmann, as counsel for 
respondent petitioner, First Security Bank of Utah, N. A., 
hereby certifies that the foregoing Petition For Rehearing is 
presented in good faith and not for delay, 
DATED this /g^^ay of August, 1987. 
-9-
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
THIS IS TO CERTIFY that four copies of the foregoing 
PETITION FOR REHEARING BY RESPONDENT FIRST SECURITY BANK OF 
UTAH, N. A., PERSONAL REPRESENTATIVE, were mailed, postage 
prepaid, this //)- day of August, 1987, to: 
Pete N. Vlahos, Esq. 
Vlahos St Sharp 
2447 Kiesel Avenue 
Ogden, UT 84401 
A,d^ 04i^.M\^^^ 
4834o 
-10-
